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PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY
CASES
INTRODUCTION
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., developed and marketed in the
late 1950's a drug known as MER/29 to help reduce blood cho-
lesterol, then thought to be a major cause of hardening of the
arteries, eventually leading to a heart attack. As the use of the
drug became widespread, doctors and health officials noticed
side effects which they attributed to the drug, although
Richardson-Merrell had not disclosed that any such conse-
quences could result from using the drug. The most serious side
effect was the appearance of cataracts on the eyes of some
users, a condition which led to partial loss of sight in a few
cases. Investigation by plaintiffs' attorneys and the Food and
Drug Administration of Richardson-Merrell's conduct in pro-
ducing and marketing MER/29 revealed records and tests had
been falsified and a report to the FDA, necessary in order to
market a new drug, contained false information as to the drug's
safety. Well over 1000 personal injury claims were eventually
filed against the manufacturer of MER/29, many seeking puni-
tive damages in addition to compensatory damages.'
The MER/29 litigation clearly brought to focus for the first
time the issue of whether punitive damages should and could
be allowed in products liability cases.' At first glance, the
MER/29 litigation appears to present the perfect situation for
allowing punitive awards. A California court was satisfied that
deliberate falsification of safety information justified applica-
1. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster
Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 116, 116-18 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Rheingold]. The
conduct of Richardson-Merrell may not have been as bad as Rheingold's description
implies since the court did not discuss punitive damages or even find the company
liable in Lewis v. Baker, 243 Ore. 317, 413 P.2d 400 (1966) (overruled on the issue of
adequacy of warning to find liability in McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 528
P.2d 522, 534 (Ore. 1974)).
2. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967);
Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967). In
Standard Oil Co. v. Gunn, 234 Ala. 598, 176 So. 332 (1937), injury resulted from a
defective product but the issue of punitive damages was considered as a problem in
contracts. See Tozer, Punitive Damages and Products Liability, 39 INS. COUNSELJ. 300
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Tozerl; Note, Allowance of Punitive Damages in Products
Liability Claims, 6 GA. L. REv. 613 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, Punitive
Damagesl.
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tion of the doctrine of punitive damages-' However, a federal
court in New York concluded that allowing punitive damages
in a products case created problems which courts could not
effectively resolve and therefore did not allow such damages.
Those problems emerge, that court explained, because the cir-
cumstances presented by a products case are necessarily differ-
ent than those presented by cases which have traditionally
allowed punitive damages.'
This comment will explore the function and application of
punitive damages and consider the circumstances of products
liability cases. From that, this comment will advance the thesis
that products liability cases are unlikely ever to be appropriate
for punitive damage awards within the traditional doctrine. To
the extent that courts should punish or deter commercial
callousness toward consumer safety, the doctrine of punitive
damages must be modified. Any modification, however, will
confront the courts with problems which they cannot effec-
tively resolve. The legislature, not the courts, should act to
deter and punish manufacturers for marketing products in dis-
regard of consumer safety.
THEORETICAL BASIS OF PUNITIvE DAMAGES DOCTRINE
Punitive Damages Theory Generally
Punitive damages have been allowed since 1763 as punish-
ment for a defendant's outrageous conduct,5 a practice devel-
oped and sustained in part by the inability of courts at that
time to set aside excessive jury awards.' Although courts now
have the power to limit excessive awards, the doctrine has be-
come rooted in our system of law and the great majority of
states allow punitive damages.
As a doctrine based on punishment, exemplary damages
have been criticized as an anomaly in the civil law, "the sole
object [of which] is to return full monetary compensation for
3. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398
(1967).
4. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 840-41 (2d Cir. 1967).
5. Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. K.B. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763); see Note,Exemplarv Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1957) thereinafter
cited as Note, Exemplar' Damagesi.
6. W. HALE, DAMAGES 302 (2d ed. 1912) Ihereinafter cited as HALE]; Note,
Exemplar' v Damages, supra note 5, at 518-20.
7. Note, Exemplao, Damages, supra note 5, at 517-18.
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a legal wrong .... ,, The New Hampshire Supreme Court
wrote in 1873,
What is a civil remedy but . . . compensation for damage
sustained by the plaintiff?. How could the idea of punish-
ment be deliberately and designedly installed as a doctrine
of civil remedies? Is not punishment out of place, irregular,
anomalous, exceptional, unjust, unscientific, not to say
absurd and ridiculous, when classed among civil remedies?
What kind of civil remedy for the plaintiff is the punish-
ment of the defendant? The idea is wrong. It is a mon-
strous heresy, .... deforming the symmetry of the body of
the law.9
Professor Morris, in an often cited article on punitive dam-
ages, was less critical of the doctrine. He believed that punish-
ment is a part of every compensatory damage award, and thus
a proper concern in civil cases. The plaintiff, it is true, is com-
pensated because he is injured but the defendant is made to
pay that compensation because he is at fault in causing the
injury. Any payment by the defendant, therefore, serves to
punish him and admonish him and others not to cause injury.10
The idea of compensation, however, is so ingrained in the no-
tion of damages that one tends to forget this admonitory func-
tion." Professor Morris concluded that "the scope of the use of
punitive damages would be framed in terms of the needs and
efficacy of admonition .... ."'I But where they cannot be so
framed, he conceded, punitive damages serve no effective func-
tion. 3
Recognition of the punitive aspect of compensatory dam-
ages, however, does not establish in them a punitive purpose.
Otherwise, punitive damages could be claimed in any situation
where the defendant was at fault. The civil law developed prin-
ciples of fault to establish who should sustain the loss caused
by an injury, not to determine whether the tortfeasor should be
8. Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 162, 116 P. 530, 539 (1911); HALE, supra note 6,
at §§ 87-88; C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 275 (1935) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMICKI;
Duffy, Punitive Damages: A Doctrine Which Should Be Abolished, in THE CASE
AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 4 (Defense Research Institute 1969).
9. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873).
10. Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1174, 1177,
1182 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Morrisi; Note, Exemplary Damages, supra note 5,
at 522-23.
11. Morris, supra note 10, at 1187-88.
12. Id. at 1191.
13. Id. at 1192-95.
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punished. The civil law, in its concern for punishment, focuses
on the defendant's state of mind in causing an injury" and has
formulated a doctrine that attaches to intentional misconduct.
The necessary prerequisite for punitive damages, accord-
ing to Professor McCormick, is "a positive element of conscious
wrongdoing.""' It is not enough that the defendant was at fault
in causing the injury-there also must be the aggravated
circumstance of the defendant having a culpable mind in
causing the injury."6 This state of mind can exist in two situa-
tions where the injury is intentional.
The most easily recognized situation is where the injury is
deliberately caused by the defendant's ill will toward the plain-
tiff or by some evil motive. 7 In the second situation, the injury
can be said to be intentional, thus indicating a culpable mind,
without the presence of ill will. Where the defendant acts,
knowing that his conduct will result in an injury, the law can
presume that the injury was intended. 8 The aggravating cir-
cumstance is the consciousness that injury will result from the
conduct.
A third situation is occasionally but incorrectly considered
appropriate for punitive damages. This is the case where the
defendant realizes that his conduct poses a risk of injury.
Where there is a possibility that an injury will not result from
certain conduct, the law cannot presume that the injury was
intentional. Therefore, unless the risk was prompted by ill will
or evil motive, there is no culpable mind. At most, the defen-
dant is guilty of gross negligence which could be characterized
as recklessness. A fine line separates intentional infliction of
injury from gross negligence, but it must be distinguished."
Although the former justifies punitive damages, the latter does
not.21'
14. 1). DOHBS, REMEDIES 205 (1973) [hereinafter cited as DOBBS]; see, e.g., G.D.
Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975).
15. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, at 280. See also W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS
9-10 (4th ed. 1971) Ihereinafter cited as PROSSERI.
16. l)OB~s, supra note 14, at 205; HALE, supra note 6, at 200; McCoRMICK, supra
note 8, at 280.
17. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 9-10.
18. Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co., 11 Cal. 3d 908, 922 & n.10, 523 P.2d 662,
671 & n.10, 114 Cal. Rptr. 622, 631 & n.10 (1974).
19. Prosser referred to gross negligence as that "unhappy term of ill-defined
content, which occasionally, in a few jurisdictions, has been stretched to include the
element of conscious indifference to consequences, and so to justify punitive damages."
PROSSER, supra note 15, at 10.
20. See, e.g., Gombos v. Ashe, 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 527, 322 P.2d 933, 939
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Professor Morris cited an example2 to illustrate a nondeli-
berate injury that is presumed to be intentional.22 Suppose that
a man deliberately shoots a gun into a crowded train. Even
assuming he had no evil motive, he must have known that
somebody certainly would be injured. There is a presumption
of intent to injure based on the circumstances. A less clear
example, which illustrates the difficulty of distinguishing be-
tween gross negligence and conscious wrongdoing associated
with a culpable mind, was considered by Judge Friendly. 3
Suppose that a man, who knows that he is drunk, drives his
automobile. The man is unconscious of his victim and nondeli-
berately causes an accident. Judge Friendly considered this to
be a proper situation in which to award punitive damages.24
The rationale for allowing punitive damages here is best under-
stood by considering this to be a situation where the risk of
injury was so high as to create a certainty that injury would
result and therefore an inference that the injury was inten-
tional. California, on the contrary, has consistently refused to
allow punitive damages in this type of case,25 although the force
of that position has recently been undermined.
In addition to punishment, punitive damages have also
been awarded as a method of deterring undesirable conduct."
The functions of punishment and deterrence are closely con-
nected and thus, as with the punitive function, punitive dam-
ages are not used to deter every act of misconduct, but only
intentional acts. Although the efficacy of the deterrent function
has been criticized,27 there are situations where intentional in-
juries can best be prevented by the use of punitive damages.
For example, where a defendant has sold worthless bonds, a
return of the victim's purchase price (by way of compensatory
(1958), where the court wrote that "[mlere negligence, even gross negligence is not
sufficient to justify such an award."
21. Morris, supra note 10, at 1181.
22. Injury may be nondeliberate in the sense that it was not planned by the
defendant and yet still be intentional in the sense that defendant knew that his con-
duct would cause injury. Compare G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App.
3d 22, 30, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 223 (1975), with Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co., 11
Cal. 3d 908, 922, 523 P.2d 662, 671, 114 Cal. Rptr. 622, 631 (1974).
23. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838 (2d Cir. 1967).
24. See, e.g., PROSSER, supra note 15, at 10 n.6.
25. See, e.g., Gombos v. Ashe, 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 527-28, 322 P.2d 933, 940
(1958).
26. Note, Exemplary Damages, supra note 5, at 522.
27. See DOBBS, supra note 14, at 219-20 & n.88.
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damages) will not cause the defendant to suffer any loss.28 In
other situations the defendant might even be willing to suffer
what would appear to be a loss by paying compensatory dam-
ages if that was less expensive than refraining from causing an
injury. 2 A defendant might even go so far as to consider com-
pensatory damages a routine cost of business, payment of
which would still leave him better off than changing his
method."' In this situation, compensatory damages would not
even serve to admonish him. Punitive damages, by adding to
the cost of causing an injury, can force a defendant to avoid
inflicting injury.
A few courts have also considered compensation for losses
or costs not recoverable by ordinary damages to be a sufficient
foundation for awarding punitive damages." Additionally, con-
duct which is deserving of punishment might continue una-
bated or go unpunished if the public prosecutors do not act and
the compensatory recovery for the plaintiff is not sufficient tojustify the cost of proving the defendant was at fault. 2 These
rationales are less valid today since actual damages may in-
clude allowance for pain and suffering;33 further, the develop-
28. This was recognized in Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 406, 179 N.E.2d
497, 499, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (1961), where the court wrote:
Exemplary damages are more likely to serve their desired purpose of
deterring similar conduct in a fraud case . . . than in any other area of
tort. . . . A judgment simply for compensatory damages would require
the offender to do no more than return the money which he had taken
from the plaintiff.
29. Funk v. H.S. Kerbaugh, Inc., 222 Pa. 18, 70 A. 953 (1908). In this case, thedefendant continued blasting rock despite the plaintiff's complaint that his property
was being damaged as a result. Apparently the defendant thought that paying for theproperty damage was cheaper than using some other method of removing the rock.
30. The doctrine of strict liability recognizes that some products inevitably willbe injurious. Since manufacturers confront a constant risk of injury, the cost of com-pensating injured consumers can be included as a cost of doing business. However, thisis not the same as including the compensation for avoidable injuries in the cost of doingbusiness. See generally Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products andStrict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Traynor].
31. McCoRMICK, supra note 8, at 277; Note, Exemplary Damages, supra note 5,
at 520. Three states have expressly recognized this justification: Doroszka v. Lavine,II Conn. 575, 150 A. 692 (1930); Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 220, 190 N.W. 746 (1922);
Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1873).
32. DoHBs, supra note 14, at 205; MCCORMICK, supra note 8, at 276; cf. Rice,Exemplar, Damages in Private Consumer Actions, 55 IOWA L. REV. 307 (1969).
33. Doims, supra note 14, at 136. A general rule throughout the United States isthat a successful litigant may not recover his attorney's fees from the losing party. See,
e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); D'Amico v.Board of Medical Examiners, 11 Cal. 3d 1, 520 P.2d 10, 112 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1974). This
rule is codified in CAL,. Civ. PRO. CODE § 1021 (West 1955).
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ment of concepts of liability without fault makes the cost of
prosecuting a tortfeasor less expensive since liability is much
easier to establish. At least with respect to products liability
cases, therefore, these justifications cannot easily be ac-
cepted."
The argument that conduct might go unpunished without
the allowance of punitive damages applies only to the situation
where the defendant was reckless but could not be said to have
intended the injury, since punitive damages already apply to
more outrageous conduct. As noted above it is questionable
whether any conduct is really deserving of civil law punishment
when the misconduct only amounts to recklessness. Certainly
there is no standard by which a potential defendant could know
when his conduct will be punished. One must remember that
compensatory damages have a punitive aspect and to the ex-
tent that that is not adequate punishment, the civil law is not
concerned unless the conduct intentionally causes injury. An
award of punitive damages represents a windfall to the plaintiff
which, in fairness, the defendant should not have to pay unless
he is being punished for his intentional misconduct.35
California's Punitive Damages Doctrine
As the discussion above illustrates, punitive damages are
awarded for deliberate injuries or nondeliberate injuries under
circumstances where the defendant knew that injury would
result from his conduct. In the latter case, the intentional infl-
iction of injury is presumed because of the certainty of injury.
Initially, however, California took the position that a plaintiff
could recover punitive damages only where he was injured de-
liberately."
California has codified the award of punitive damages in
section 3294 of the Civil Code, which permits punitive damages
34. See Tozer, supra note 2, at 304.
35. Punitive damages also represent a windfall to plaintiffs' attorneys who may
have the strongest interest in expanding the application of punitive damages. Two
recent bills in the California Legislature (S.B. 2011 and S.B. 1870) would require the
court to set attorney's fees with respect to any punitive damage award and would
prohibit such awards except for deliberate injuries. These bills have been strongly
opposed only by the California Trial Lawyers Association. CTLA NEws, June, 1976,
at 1.
36. See, e.g., Wolfsen v. Hathaway, 32 Cal. 2d 632, 198 P.2d 1 (1948) (overruled
on an issue not relevant here in Flores v. Arroyo, 56 Cal. 2d 492, 364 P.2d 263, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 87 (1961)); Gombos v. Ashe, 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 322 P.2d 933 (1958).
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"for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defen-
dant" where he is guilty of "oppression, fraud or malice."37
Oppression exists where one party dominates another so as to
subject him to cruel and unjust hardships." An action for fraud
arises when "a material and knowingly false representation,
made with intent to induce action, causes reasonable and detri-
mental reliance."": Finally, "[m]alice in fact . . . denotes ill
will on the part of the defendant .... ",0
If products liability cases are held separate, there is a com-
mon denominator in fraud cases which have allowed punitive
damages, which may indicate a limitation of punitive damages
to certain types of fraud cases. This common factor is that the
injury sued upon is the same injury intended to result from the
fraud.4' Where the gain from the fraud is equal to or greater
than the injury, as when the fraud causes the sale of an item
for twice its true value, compensatory damages or restitution
will not deter the defendant and punitive damages thus be-
come necessary. In Mahon v. Berg, for example, the defen-
dants tried to sell real property by misrepresenting the income
it could produce. The court recognized that limiting damages
to compensation meant the defendant "risked only the fruits
of his fraud."43
The concept of malice as a basis for punitive damages was
first set out in California in Davis v. Hearst." The court distin-
guished between malice in fact and malice implied in law; only
37. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West 1970).
38. E.g., G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 27, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 218, 221 (1975); Roth v. Shell Oil Co., 185 Cal. App. 2d 676, 681-82, 8 Cal. Rptr.
514, 517-18 (1960). Since products liability cases involve parties who are not in close
contact, the domination which characterizes oppression will not exist in these types of
cases.
39. Block v. Tobin, 45 Cal. App. 3d 214, 219, 119 Cal. Rptr. 288, 290 (1975); See
CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1709-11 (West 1973).
40. Gombos v. Ashe, 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 527, 322 P.2d 933, 940 (1958). But
see Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co., 11 Cal. 3d 908, 922, 523 P.2d 662, 671, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 622, 631 (1974).
41. Compare Mohon v. Berg, 267 Cal. App. 2d 588, 73 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1968), with
Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961). This point
is more difficult to perceive in Block v. Tobin, 45 Cal. App. 3d 214, 119 Cal. Rptr. 288
(1975), since the defendant did not directly benefit from plaintiff's injury. Neverthe-
less, the injury was a necessary part of defendant's scheme and it was intentional, in
the sense that the defendant knew the injury would result.
42. See Block v. Tobin, 45 Cal. App. 3d 214, 220, 119 Cal. Rptr. 288, 290-91
(1975).
43. 267 Cal. App. 2d 588, 590, 73 Cal. Rptr. 356, 357 (1968); see Ward v. Taggart,
51 Cal. 2d 736, 743, 336 P.2d 534, 538 (1959).
44. 160 Cal. 143, 116 P. 530 (1911).
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the former was sufficient.45 The controlling and essential factor
in malice in fact, according to the court, was the evil motive of
the defendant in causing the injury." What the court meant by
malice in fact was that the injury was deliberate, although
proof of that could be implied from the evidence. However, a
nondeliberate injury, which could be presumed to have been
intentional, was not a sufficient basis for punitive damages.
The California Supreme Court elaborated its view of mal-
ice in Wolfsen v. Hathaway." To establish malice in fact, the
court required a showing of defendant's personal intent to
injure the plaintiff4"-that is, that the defendant deliberately
injured the plaintiff. In Wol/sen, the plaintiff and the defen-
dant had quarreled on a few occasions before the defendant
plowed up the plaintiff's pasture and mysterious fires occurred
on the plaintiff's land. Although the defendant knew the land
belonged to someone else, he did not know the plaintiff had
leased the land. Therefore, according to the court, the defen-
dant could not have had a personal intent to injure the plain-
tiff. That the defendant knew that he was causing injury to
someone, since he knew he didn't own the land, might support
the presumption of intentional injury but would not establish
malice in fact.
Gombos v. Ashe4l followed the Davis-Wol/sen line of rea-
soning when it denied punitive damages where the plaintiff
alleged the defendant knowingly drove his automobile after
becoming too intoxicated to drive. That allegation did not sat-
isfy the evil motive requirement since it showed only a con-
sciousness of risk.5 The act causing the injury must be "con-
ceived in a spirit of mischief or with criminal indifference to-
wards the obligations owed to others. There must be an intent
to vex, annoy or injure . . . .[and a] desire to do harm for
the mere satisfaction of doing it."'" From this reasoning it is
45. Id. at 162, 116 P. at 539.
46. Id. at 164, 116 P. at 540; see G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.
App. 3d 22, 30, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 223 (1975).
47. 32 Cal. 2d 632, 198 P.2d 1 (1948) (overruled on an issue not relevant here in
Flores v. Arroyo, 56 Cal. 2d 492, 364 P.2d 263, 15 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1961)).
48. 32 Cal. 2d at 651, 198 P.2d at 12: "An award of punitive damages may not
be based upon mere speculation, but rather such penalty depends upon a definite
showing of a .. .wrongful personal intention to injure."
49. 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 322 P.2d 933 (1958).
50. Id. at 527-28, 322 P.2d at 940.
51. Id. at 527, 322 P.2d at 939. Similarly, in Ebaugh v. Raskin, 22 Cal. App. 3d
891, 895-96, 99 Cal. Rptr. 706, 709 (1972), although the defendant physician performed
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clear that the California punitive damages doctrine is more
restrictive than the general doctrine.
Other California courts, however, have not always applied
the doctrine uniformly. By using phrases such as "reckless and
willful disregard" to describe the aggravated conduct that
evokes punitive damages, there is an indication that something
less than personal intent to injure will justify the award. How
much less is not clear, however. Although the Gombos opinion
cited McDonnell v. American Trust Co.,5" that case viewed
recklessness as grounds for punitive damages. If so, this would
represent a shift toward the general rule: punitive damages are
permitted where the injury is nondeliberate if, under the cir-
cumstances, the defendant must have known that injury would
result from his conduct.
The McDonnell plaintiff alleged that the defendant knew
of the defective condition of his roof and drains and of the
possibility that the plaintiff could be injured. At the minimum,
taking the allegation as true, the defendant was negligent and
perhaps grossly negligent; the court refused to consider the
alleged facts sufficient to allow punitive damages. They did
"not spell an intentional tort (a conscious, deliberate intent to
injure the plaintiffs).""5 That much is consistent with the
Davis-Wolfsen approach. However, the McDonnell court de-
nied punitive damages on the further ground that the conduct
was not "so recklessly disregardful of the rights of others (some-
times characterized as wanton or wilful misconduct) as would
show the 'malice' in fact which the statute" requires.54 While
"reckless disregard" often refers to gross negligence, the mean-
ing here must refer to a disregard of the certainty of injury.
This follows from the court's denial of punitive damages al-
though the defendant was aware of some risk of injury.
The California Supreme Court in two recent cases55 has
departed from the Davis- Wolfsen line of reasoning. In Silberg
v. California Life Insurance Co. ,56 although the court refused to
allow punitive damages, it appeared to construe the doctrine
surgery on the wrong person, the court maintained there could be no evil motive since
the doctor did not realize the plaintiff was the wrong patient.
52. 130 Cal. App. 2d 296, 279 P.2d 138 (1955).
53. Id. at 299, 279 P.2d at 140.
54. Id.
55. Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co., 11 Cal. 3d 908, 523 P.2d 662, 114 Cal. Rptr.622 (1974); Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 711 (1974).
56. 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974).
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much as the McDonnell court had. Consistent with earlier
cases, the court noted that the defendant must be shown to
have acted "with the requisite intent to injure plaintiff,"57 al-
though the court was not clear whether it meant a deliberate
act was still required. The court went on to state that a defen-
dant "must act with the intent to vex, injure or annoy, or with
a conscious disregard of plaintiff's rights,""8 clearly requiring
less than a deliberate, personal intent to injure. Unless the
court is allowing punitive damages even for simple negligence
where the defendant is aware of a risk, "conscious disregard"
must relate to conduct from which an intent to injure can be
presumed.
This view of Silberg is consistent with the later opinion of
Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co.5" Without expressly overrul-
ing Wolfsen, the court rejected the requirement of showing a
personal intent to injure by expressly assuming in the opinion
that the defendants felt no personal animus toward the plain-
tiff. Intent, it wrote,
denotes not only those results the actor desires, but also
those consequences which he knows are substantially cer-
tain to result from his conduct. . . . The jury in the pres-
ent case could reasonably infer the defendants acted in
callous disregard of plaintiff's rights, knowing that their
conduct was substantially certain to vex, annoy and injure
plaintiffs.60
With Schroeder, California has adopted a more liberal pol-
icy in favor of punitive damages by no longer requiring a per-
sonal ill will toward the plaintiff. Gross negligence is still not
sufficient to evoke punitive damages. The defendant must
know that his conduct is substantially certain to result in an
injury, not that his conduct creates some risk of injury.
Whether the injury resulted from a deliberate or nondeliberate
57. Id. at 462, 521 P.2d at 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
58. Id.
59. 11 Cal. 3d 908, 523 P.2d 662, 114 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1974).
60. Id. The court of appeal clearly disregarded the Davis-Wolfsen line of cases
when it concluded in Farmy v. College Housing, Inc., 48 Cal. App. 3d 166, 174, 121
Cal. Rptr. 658, 664 (1975) (emphasis in original): "[Tio prove that a tort was mali-
ciously perpetrated it is not necessary to establish a specific intent against the person
wronged. Oppression or malice supplying such intent may be established by the con-
duct of the perpetrator." The test relied on by the court in Farmy, taken from the
Schroeder opinon, established intent on a showing that the defendant knew that his
conduct was substantially certain to vex, annoy and injure the plaintiff. Id. at 176, 121
Cal. Rptr. at 665.
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act, intent to injure must be present. Therefore, courts must
be careful to avoid simply characterizing conduct as "reckless"
and then assuming that punitive damages are applicable.6 Al-
though that term could be used, as in the McDonnell opinion,
to characterize conduct having a substantial certainty of caus-
ing injury, it could also characterize gross negligence. Only the
first characterization will justify punitive damages.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY DOCTRINE
The concept of products liability is considered to have
emerged with MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,62 in which the
New York court eliminated privity of contract as a barrier to
consumer relief when the third party manufacturer was at
fault. The court rejected the idea that manufacturers were only
liable to an immediate buyer. Since their products were unden-
iably produced for the ultimate consumer their duty of care
should extend to that consumer. Thus, the decision raised "to
normal" the manufacturer's standard of care in making of the
product. 3
Concern for consumer safety and for allowing a remedy
even when negligence could not be shown led other courts to
harness the concept of res ipsa loquitur.11 This doctrine allowed
the inference of negligence when the product causing the acci-
dent would not, in the ordinary course of events, have caused
injury unless it had been negligently produced and the defect
in the product was present when the manufacturer had exclu-
sive control of the product. Some courts also looked to theories
of warranty to provide a means of establishing a manufac-
turer's liability when the consumer was injured.65 Both of these
concepts had limitations which prevented relief for some in-jured consumers."
61. Gombos v. Ashe, 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 529, 322 P.2d 933, 940 (1958).
62. 217 N.Y. 382, Ill N.E. 1050 (1916); see Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50
MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, Citadel].
63. Cf. Traynor, supra note 30, at 364.
64. See, e.g., Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514, 532, 203 P.2d 522,
533 (1949).
65. See PROSSER, supra note 15, at 650. In Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash.456, 12 P.2d 409, aff'd on rehearing, 15 P.2d 1118 (1932), the court concluded that salesliterature had warranted that the automobile's windshield was shatterproof. Plaintiff
was allowed to recover for an injury suffered after a rock broke the windshield, notwith-
standing that technology had not yet reached the point of being able to construct a
shatterproof windshield.
66. Prosser, Citadel, supra note 62, at 801; Traynor, supra note 30, at 364-65.
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In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. ,'7 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court finally established a theory of strict liabil-
ity to protect consumers from injuries caused by defective
products. Under this theory, regardless of the care used in pro-
ducing the product or the lack of representations as to the
product's fitness, the injured consumer can recover by showing
the product was defective when purchased and the injury re-
sulted while using the product in a way it was intended to be
used. Although neither the manufacturer nor the consumer
may have been negligent, if there is an injury, someone must
bear the cost. The court found that the manufacturer who
places his products on the market can expect that a few might
cause injury and is therefore in a position to accept the cost of
compensating an injured consumer by distributing that cost
among all of the products sold. 9 The consumer, on the con-
trary, seldom is able to anticipate an injury and can not act to
distribute the loss caused by such injury. In a manner of
speaking, strict liability forces the manufacturer to act as an
insurer of his products, the cost of which is spread among all
consumers as a cost of the product. 1 In addition, imposing such
a burden of liability can have the effect of insuring a higher
standard of care: the manufacturer, to avoid liability, will at-
tempt to eliminate even those injuries which would result
under a "reasonable man" standard of care.
71
THE APPLICATION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO PRODUCTS LIABILITY
CASES
Initially, one should keep in mind that punitive damages
developed long before there was any thought of holding a man-
67. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
68. Id. at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
69. Traynor, supra note 30, at 366.
70. Justice Traynor wrote in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453,
462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (concurring opinion):
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet
its consequences. The cost of injury and the loss of time or health may
be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one,
for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed
among the public as a cost of doing business. . . . However intermit-
tently such injuries may occur and however haphazardly they may strike,
the risk of their occurrence is a constant risk and a general one. Against
such a risk there should be general and constant protection and the
manufacturer is best situated to afford such protection.
71. See Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1119 (1960)
I hereinafter cited as Prosser, The Assault].
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ufacturer liable for injuries caused by his products to a third
party consumer. The doctrine was developed in the context of
a one-to-one relationship, as where the defendant assaults the
plaintiff. Because that one-to-one relationship does not exist in
a products liability case, this type of case may not fit within
the developed framework of the punitive damages doctrine. At
the very least, to insure that the doctrine is not twisted simply
to apply it to a products case, one should view any claim of
punitive damages in such a case with a critical eye.
Strict Liability
Strict liability does not depend upon fault. Since fault is
the keystone of punitive damages, if a plaintiff must recover in
strict liability there is no basis for recovery of punitive dam-
ages. The two concepts, are mutually exclusive, at least to the
extent that the plaintiff must rely on strict liability.7" Where
the defendant cannot show even negligence, he cannot show
conduct from which an intent to injure can be established.
Although there has been some suggestion that punitive dam-
ages could apply in strict liability,73 that commentator also
considered malice to exist. As yet, no cases have allowed puni-
tive damages merely on a showing of strict liability.
Manufacturer Misconduct Resulting in Single Injuries
When products are produced in quantity it is not unrea-
sonable to expect a few defective units to be placed on the
market despite the exercise of due care. Only those individual
units pose a danger to consumers. Misconduct may also create
defective units, but it is not reasonable to believe that the
manufacturer would deliberately create a risk in a few specific
units when he is mass producing hundreds or thousands of
similar units. As a general rule, the fact that the defect was
isolated implies that it was not intentionally caused. This view
is strengthened by the fact that the manufacturer produces his
goods for anonymous consumers.
Although there is not likely to be a deliberate intent to
make a few units defective, punitive damages would be none-
theless appropriate where the non-deliberate injury can be pre-
72. Tozer, supra note 2, at 301; Note, Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at 626-
27. But cf. Drake v. Wham-O Mfg. Co., 373 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
73. J. COTCHETT & R. CARTWRIGHT, CALIFORNIA PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS §9.06[6] (1975); see Drake v. Wham-O Mfg. Co., 373 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
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sumed to be intentional. Thus, if the manufacturer knows that
a few injuries will result from the product, but finds compen-
sating for those to be more economical than producing a safer
product, he can be said to have intended the injury. This is the
classic instance where punitive damages are necessary to insure
that intentional injury is not allowed to continue." The appli-
cation of punitive damages to the few injuries which result can
increase the overall cost of production to the point where the
safest product is also the cheapest to produce.
For this situation to exist, however, the manufacturer
must know that an injury is substantially certain to result from
his conduct. If courts are unable to find this economic motive
for allowing injury, there probably will not be any awareness
of a certainty of injury. Where the manufacturer foresaw only
a risk of injury or just didn't bother to use a better method,
without realizing the consequences, there might be gross negli-
gence characterized as recklessness, but there would not be an
intent to injure which could justify punitive damages. 5
In his work on drug product liability, Dixon criticized the
fact that "[m]any decisions are made on purely economic
grounds."" In his example there was a risk of injury and of huge
profits if the drug proved beneficial. This is the type of
economic gamble, Dixon concluded, which punitive damages
should prevent. But this is not the situation discussed above
where punitive damages could appropriately and usefully be
awarded. While the gamble that profit will exceed losses from
a few expected injuries shows an intent to injure, the gamble
that a risk will not materialize in an injury shows negligence
74. See text accompanying notes 26-30 supra.
75. In Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Il1. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969), afl'd,
46 11. 2d 788, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970), defendant's misconduct in the manufacture of
Drano drain cleaner resulted in a single injury. Plaintiff's injury was caused when a
can of Drano exploded due to a build up of gas. The court considered the defendant's
failure to test the can's bursting point to be recklessly disregardful of the safety of its
customers, since had the bursting point been higher, the cap would have acted as a
"safety valve." Although the court found the defendant was aware that gas would be
created when Drano came into contact with water and that it was common for manu-
facturers to test the strength of their cans, there was no finding of sufficient knowledge
to imply an intent to injure. No inquiry considered whether the defendant consciously
refused safer conduct in order to secure an economic or other advantage. Indeed, there
was no showing that the defendant even consciously accepted the risk of injury. The
award of punitive damages must have been based on a finding of gross negligence,
though even that degree of misconduct is questionable.
76. M. DIXON, DRuc. PRODUCT LIABILITY § 9.07[2], at 9-79 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as DIXONI.
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or gross negligence only. This distinction is not simply a matter
of semantics. The civil law does not function to punish the
defendant except where it can be said that he intended an
injury to result. For negligence or gross negligence the plaintiff
is fully compensated in a legal sense. If more should be done it
is either outside of the civil law or for the legislature to deter-
mine.
Using punitive damages to compel the manufacturer to
use the safest method of production poses to courts problems
which they may not be able to or should not be allowed to
settle. Courts will be forced to resolve the extent to which
businessmen should not take economic gambles. For example,
on one hand, to force all producers to use the most expensive
method of production could push the unit price of a product
beyond what consumers would be willing to pay. Producers in
that event would be forced out of business, at least with regard
to that product. While that might appear reasonable when the
product is worthless and injures all users, it is less reasonable
when the risk of injury is only 1 in 10,000, could be lowered only
to 1 in 50,000 and the product is valuable to those who are not
injured by it.
If courts decide to apply punitive damages selectively they
will be forced to balance a variety of interests which would
probably be better left to experts in the field of product safety.
Where the risk of injury is low and the possible injury is minor,
a court could refuse to apply punitive damages. But when the
risk increases or the possible injury is more severe should the
courts say the product can no longer be produced? At what
point is the risk too high or the injury too severe or the benefit
too minimal? These may be questions which the court answers
in order to award compensatory damages. But the concern
there is much different. An actual loss exists because of the
injury, the concern is only who should pay for that loss, not the
ultimate worth of the product.
On the other hand, even if the product is not forced off the
market, production might be confined to the one or two largest
firms which, by their economies of scale, could still produce at
a profit using the more expensive method. Although a safer
product is then produced, the government would have elimi-
nated competition. This situation might have two effects.
First, quality control might lessen since consumers would not
be able to turn to another source. In this case punitive damages
would have been counter-productive. Second, if competitors
went out of business altogether, it is not unlikely that fewer
910
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new products would be developed. For example, laboratories
which might otherwise have developed a new drug would not
be around to do so and the laboratories still functioning might
never make up for that loss.
One might not object to a tendency toward monopoly as a
price to pay for a safer product. However, the problem of decid-
ing that a product should be eliminated from the market be-
cause the production of a safer product is too expensive can be
subjective and may involve many considerations. Courts are
not experts in product safety. They cannot say that all eco-
nomic gambles are undesirable and ought not to be the judge
of which economic gambles are bad and which are good.
Misconduct Resulting in Multiple Injuries
The few cases which thus far have considered punitive
damages in connection with products liability have largely in-
volved inherently defective products." That is, each unit sold
is capable of causing injury to the purchaser as opposed to
defects that do not exist in all units of a particular product or
would result only in isolated cases of injury. This type of defect
is not likely to result from the type of conduct that warrants
punitive damages.
Punitive damages would be justified if the defect was de-
liberately created in the product for an evil motive or from a
desire to injure for the sake of injuring. While this may be a
theoretical possibility, it is unreasonable to believe that a man-
ufacturer would want to injure hundreds or thousands of anon-
ymous consumers. Punitive damages would also be justified if
the defect was allowed to exist even though injury was certain
to result. But here again the situation is unlikely to occur. If
there was a certainty of widespread injury known to the manu-
facturer it is more likely that the product would be withdrawn
in order to avoid extensive compensatory damages. The more
probable situation is that a few injuries were expected to result
in order to gain a profit by the sale of the drug. Although
punitive damages would apply to this intentional misconduct,
the same problems arise here as in the circumstance where only
a few injuries result from the misconduct.
Only in California have punitive damages been awarded in
a products liability case where the defect was inherent and
77. E.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967). Toole
v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
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resulted in multiple injuries.7" To sustain such an award, in
relation to misconduct causing multiple injuries, a court could,
and in California must find either fraud, malice or oppression.
Although these elements of fraud or malice may appear to exist
in a products liability case, they are not likely to be available
to justify punitive damages."
Fraud. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in Hoffman
v. Sterling Drug, Inc.," ruled that punitive damages could be
obtained where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant fraudu-
lently and deceitfully misrepresented the safety of its product.
The circumstances of that case led the court to conclude that
the defendant could have known that the product would cause
serious injury.8' In fact, the defendant did provide some infor-
mation about reported injuries in its literature on the drug.
Plaintiff's contention, however, was that the warning of serious
side effects was insufficient in relation to the risks involved,
and that it thus amounted to misrepresentation.
Although the fraud in this case may have reflected an
intent to injure the plaintiff as he was in fact injured, the court
relied on Pennsylvania cases which permit such awards for
gross negligence. Thus if the fraud amounted to gross negli-
gence, it would justify punitive damages. Neither California
nor the general doctrine of punitive damages would sustain the
award on this showing alone. Rather, the fraud must show an
intent to cause the injury upon which the pliantiff sues.
Fraud is an intentional tort, but a subtle distinction must
be observed. The misrepresentation may be intentional while
the injury sued upon is not. The consumer fraud cases which
allow punitive damages are basically different from products
liability cases involving fraud, at least where injury was not
substantially certain to result.2 In a typical consumer fraud
situation, the defendant often risks only the gain of his deceit
and has little, if anything, to lose by paying compensatory
damages. Moreover, the injury sued upon was intended to re-
sult from the fraud.
78. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 3d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398
(1967).
79. As noted previously, the element of oppression is not likely to be present in
products liability cases. See note 38 supra.
80. 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973). This case involved the use of Aralen which caused
damage to the retina after prolonged use.
81. Id. at 146.
82. But see Note, Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at 620-22.
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Products liability fraud cases, on the other hand, lack this
direct relationship between the injury intended and the injury
sued upon. The defendant in such a case might have intention-
ally misrepresented his product without realizing that any per-
sonal injury would result. The injury intended might be simply
obtaining the price of the item. In this situation the personal
injury sued upon is not the injury intended, and so punitive
damages are not applicable. Thus, while fraud may exist in a
products case, courts can not assume it to be the type that
would evoke punitive damages. Since the application of puni-
tive damages turns on the defendant's intent, this distinction
between intentional misrepresentation and intent to cause per-
sonal injury must not be overlooked. 3
Malice. Malice, in the context of punitive damages, re-
fers to an intent to injure and is therefore most easily recog-
nized as a deliberate act. 4 Because of the nature of products
liability cases, one must concede, that a deliberate injury, in
the sense of a personal intent to injure, will not likely be found.
Nondeliberate injury can also be characterized as malicious,
but only when the defendant acts knowing that an injury will
result from his conduct. Consciousness of risk may show reck-
lessness, but not the malice necessary to warrant punitive dam-
ages.
Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.5 is the only California
case to have purportedly found malice in a products liability
case. It is unclear, however, what definition of malice the court
83. The plaintiff's burden of proof, therefore, should not only be to show the
deception, but also to show the defendant knew the injuries were substantially certain
to result from use of the product. This distinction between intent to deceive and intent
to injure can be illustrated by considering Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratory Div. of
Sterling Drug, Inc., 514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974). The defendant in this case represented
that the drug Talwin was safe and free from all dangers of addiction. The manufacturer
either knew the representation was false and the drug was dangerous or did not know
whether the representation was true or false. In either case, the court considered the
defendant guilty of fraud. According to Dixon,
[ilf the manufacturer, in fact did not know the drug was addictive, it
must have been because it did not test the drug. The only alternative is
that the drug was known to be addictive and that the manufacturer
wantonly and intentionally made representations known to be false.
DIXON, supra note 76, § 9.07[1], at 9-66.3. Although the defendant has intentionally
deceived the victim in both cases, only in the latter case can there also be an intent to
injure, implied from the defendant's knowledge.
84. See Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co., 11 Cal. 3d 908, 922, 523 P.2d 662, 671,
114 Cal. Rptr. 622, 631 (1974); Gombos v. Ashe, 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 527, 322 P.2d
933, 939 (1958).
85. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
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used. Although the court explained that deliberate intent to do
harm was not a prerequisite to recovery of punitive damages,
it went on to maintain that the defendant's conduct had to be
"wilful, intentional, and done in reckless disregard of its pos-
sible results."" This is a disjunctive description of malice: "If
conduct is negligent, it is not willful; if it is willful, it is not neg-
ligent.""7 Richardson-Merrell intentionally marketed MER/29
and must have known that it posed a risk to consumers. Dis-
regarding potention injuries, risking the safety of consumers
who would use the product, can be considered reckless. But
all of this goes to the conduct and not to the state of mind in
causing the injury. To find malice, the jury must "assess the
defendant's actual state of mind; it is not satisfied by charac-
terizing his conduct as unreasonable, negligent, grossly negli-
gent or reckless."88
The evidence in Toole showed that the defendant disre-
garded the possibility of injury in its eagerness to market its
drug. Not only did the defendant falsify test records to ensure
that the FDA would allow the drug on the market, but also it
continued to represent the drug as proven safe when it had not
been so proven. This might be evidence that Richardson-
Merrell realized injury would result from the drug but expected
the profit to offset that loss. That would be conduct warranting
punitive damages." But the court did not specifically find this.
Instead, the overall conclusion was that Richardson-Merrell
made a terrible miscalculation rather than that it purposely
allowed injuries in order to profit from the sale of the drug.8 '
In G.D. Searle v. Superior Court," the court explained
that malice, in the context of nondeliberate injury, could exist
where the manufacturer is aware of the dangerous potential of
86. Id. at 713, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
87.. G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 31, 122 Cal. Rptr.
218, 224 (1975) citing Donnelly v. Southern Pacific Co., 18 Cal. 2d 863, 869, 118 P.2d
465, 468 (1941).
88. Id.
89. See Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co., 11 Cal. 3d 908, 922, 523 P.2d 662, 671,
114 Cal. Rptr. 622, 631 (1974).
90. An executive of Richardson-Merrell stated to the Food and Drug Administra-
tion that MER/29 "was the biggest and most important drug in Merrell history. .. "
and the company intended "to defend it at every step . ... Toole v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 3d 689, 714-15, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 416 (1967). While this
statement might reflect a sinister economic desire to profit at any cost, it could also
indicate a sincere belief that a socially useful drug had been developed. Cf. Roginsky
v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 845 (2d Cir. 1967).
91. 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975).
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its product." A "consciousness of risk," the court maintained,
made the conduct more than reckless, adding the evil motive
essential for application of punitive damages." This represents
a new interpretation of the California punitive damages doc-
trine, however, since knowledge of a risk is not the same as
knowledge that injury is substantially certain to result.
Is A NEW FORMULATION DESIRABLE?
Reasons for Modification
The current state of the law presents courts with a di-
lemma. On the one hand, the punitive damages doctrine as
formulated will not sanction punitive damages where the de-
fendant was only negligent or reckless. On the other hand,
consumer safety is an important concern which can be fur-
thered by extending liability for recklessness or even negligence
beyond compensatory damages.
Failure to resolve this dilemma leads to strained interpre-
tations of the punitive damages doctrine.94 In Searle, for exam-
ple, the court observed,
The incessant production of shifting decisional defini-
tions may spring from judicial restlessness with the Davis
v. Hearst [deliberate intent to injure] formula. Verbal-
isms coined in a libel action may seem unsuitable for a
products liability suit involving claims of commercial cal-
lousness in the manufacture, advertisement and nation-
wide distribution of allegedly dangerous pharmaceuti-
cals."
In the past, a defendant's knowledge that his action or
inaction created a risk of injury was not enough to warrant
punitive damages. However, commercial torts have been sub-
ject to greater concern for potential victims." First the require-
92. Id. at 30, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
93. Id. at 32, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
94. Id. at 30-32, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 223-25.
95. Id. at 32, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25.
96. See, e.g., McDonnell v. American Trust Co., 130 Cal. App. 2d 296, 279 P.2d
138 (1955).
97. Justice Traynor expressed the special concern that exists for the safety of
consumer products when he wrote, "It is to the public interest to discourage the
marketing of products having defects that are a menace to the public." Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (concurring opinion).
Prosser more strongly asserted that "the public interest in human life, health and
safety demands the maximum possible protection that the law can give against danger-
ous defects in products .... " Prosser, The Assualt, supra note 71, at 1122.
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ment of privity between the manufacturer and the buyer was
eliminated in order to extend the manufacturer's duty of care
to the actual user of its product. 9 Ultimately, the manufac-
turer was compelled to compensate the victim without any
showing of fault.9 Strict liability, as Prosser wrote, was in-
tended to "provide a healthy and highly desirable incentive for
producers to make their products safe."''0
This concern for the safety of the general public and the
fact that products placed on the market can cause widespread
injury permits misconduct by the manufacturer to be more
readily termed reprehensible and subject to punishment. Ac-
cording to Dixon, if a product represents a risk of injury, should
it fail, and potentially great profit, should it succeed, the corpo-
ration is making an economic gamble by marketing it"t-a
gamble which Dixon believes punitive damages could and
should prevent.' 2
Courts may find that products liability cases represent an
area of law in which concern for the safety of others must be
vigorously promoted and lack of concern by manufacturers
must be punished. If this is so, extending liability beyond com-
pensatory damages is appropriate. But this should not be at-
tempted by devising new and spurious definitions of malice. 1 3
Rather, the courts should consider only whether the manufac-
turer was conscious of a substantial risk involved in marketing
the product and yet did so despite the risk. As the court pointed
out in G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, the focus in prod-
ucts liability cases is on the commercial callousness of the de-
fendant rather than the intent with which injury was done.""1
That court sought to restate the punitive damages doctrine:
"We suggest conscious disregard of safety as an appropriate
98. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
99. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
100. Prosser, The Assault, supra note 71, at 1119.
101. DIxoN, supra note 76, § 9.07[21, at 9-79 to 9-80.
102. Id. at 9-80:
Surely it would appear that public policy should not condone a course of
conduct where the company gambles with the help [sic] of innocent
victims in an attempt to make an enormous profit. Punitive damages
should be a part of an economic gamble with the lives of others.
103. The civil law is concerned only with compensating the victim for his loss
and not with punishing the defendant, unless the injury was intentional. The special
concern for safety of commercial products does not alter this purpose of civil law except
in the field of products liability.
104. 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 32, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218. 224-25 (1975).
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description of the animus malus which may justify an exem-
plary damage award when nondeliberate injury is alleged."' 5
Reasons for Caution
Even given enhanced concern for consumer safety, courts
should give careful consideration to the problems which are
created by eliminating the requirement of intent to injure as a
prerequisite to allowing punitive damages in products liability
cases. The purpose of the civil law is to permit recovery of the
victim's loss and it is within that context that rules have been
developed to protect the defendant from unfairness. Thus,
courts should heed the admonition offered by the court in
Gombos v. Ashe: punitive damages "are not a favorite of the
law and the granting of them should be done with the greatest
caution."'
Requiring "intent to injure" provides a reliable standard
by which to judge whether punitive damages are deserved. If
it is to be enough for punitive damages simply that a defendant
knew a risk was involved, the courts would be left without a
standard. There may always be some risk that an inherent
defect in a product will cause an injury and thereby an eco-
nomic gamble in placing the product on the market. If the
product must be risk free, very few products might ever be sold.
To what extent is a manufacturer prevented from making an
economic gamble, and on what basis will acceptable gambles
be distinguished from gambles meriting punishment? Judge
Friendly voiced this concern in Roginsky v. Richardson-
Merrel1, Inc.: "[A] court should be careful not to set the scale
too low when a discovery of social utility is under review. A
strong case of recklessness could have been mounted against
Columbus had he returned to Palos with lives lost and nothing
found."107
Modification of the traditional doctrine also raises ques-
tions regarding the need for criminal law safeguards.' In Toole
v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., the court expressed the accepted
view that an action for punitive damages is purely civil in
nature.'"9 Therefore, it reasoned, constitutional or statutory
105. Id. at 32, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 225 (emphasis in original).
106. 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 526, 322 P.2d 933, 939 (1958).
107. 378 F.2d 832, 850 (1967).
108. See, e.g., Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages
Defendant, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 408 (1967).
109. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 716-17, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 418 (1967).
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safeguards applicable to a criminal trial are not mandatory.
Although a defendant could not demand these criminal
safeguards, he was provided a degree of protection by the egre-
gious nature of the misconduct that had to be shown. Further,
a defendant's acts are more nearly criminal where he intends
the injury than where he is merely aware of a risk. Such con-
duct more strongly justifies allowing civil law punishment
without criminal law safeguards than does nelgigent conduct.
The approach taken by the courts in Toole and G.D. Searle
& Co. can be viewed as a significant departure from the
traditional punitive damages doctrine. As such, in California,
in light of the legislature's definition of the standards by which
conduct can be considered sufficiently aggravating, courts are
encroaching on a function of the legislature when they attempt
to rewrite the statute by devising interpretations inconsistent
with its terms. By including the requirement of malice in Civil
Code section 3294, the legislature expressed its view that an
injury must have been intentionally caused to merit punitive
damages. The legislature does not appear to have altered its
position; two bills have recently passed the California Senate
Judiciary Committee which would require a plaintiff to prove
not only that the wrongdoer intended to injure him, but also
that he was subjected to cruel and unjust hardship.""
Even if the traditional doctrine is maintained, however, it
is questionable whether punitive damages should ever be al-
lowed in products liability cases which may result in mass
litigation;"' when the defect causing injury is inherent in the
product, there exists the possibility of mass litigation and mul-
tiple compensatory awards. Surely the prospect of extensive
compensatory damages would be as effective a deterrent as
punitive damages would be. The court, in Roginsky v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., thought the compensatory damages
paid by Richardson-Merrell would be sufficient to deter similar
future conduct."'
There is a possibility that insurance would blunt the im-
pact of compensatory damages on the manufacturer, although
in the MER/29 litigation, the insurance was not sufficient to
110. SB 2011 and SB 1870 passed out of the Senate Judiciary Committee of the
California Legislature on May 11, 1976.
111. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839, 852 (2d Cir.
1967).
112. Id. at 841.
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pay the extensive compensatory damages." ' Even so, the
Roginsky court pointed out that Richardson-Merrell was likely
to face higher insurance rates and a loss of reputation among
physicians and pharmacists."' Dixon even suggested that the
cost of obtaining insurance would have a deterrent effect. Al-
though he thought punitive damages would be a further incen-
tive, the possibility of large compensatory damages will prompt
insurance companies to investigate the activity of its insured.
"Insurance carriers will not blindly insure a company that vio-
lates its standards of behavior," according to Dixon." ' Recall-
ing the caution about awarding punitive damages suggested in
Gombos v. Ashe,"6 there seems no need to add to the incentive
of insurance costs by also allowing punitive damages."7
Finally, to allow punitive damages in a products liability
case can result in multiple punitive damages claims. The effect
could be an "overkill" which is unfair to the defendant."' Pro-
fessor Morris expressed a concern that whenever punitive dam-
ages are awarded in more than one case based on the same
misconduct the defendant is treated unfairly." 9 In the MER/29
litigation, the total punitive damages claimed exceeded the
defendant's net worth.'2 0 The possibility of multiple punitive
damages awards presents a problem which should force courts
to defer to the legislature. Courts faced with the specter of
multiple punitive damages awards outside of the products lia-
bility area have followed the lead of the Roginsky court by
rejecting the application of such damages.12
Possible Judicial Solutions
Judicial solutions to the problem of multiple punitive
113. See Rheingold, supra note 1, at 139.
114. 378 F.2d at 841.
115. DIXoN, supra note 76, § 9.07[21, at 9-80.
116. See text accompanying note 106 supra.
117. It is questionable whether insurance can protect against punitive damages
since, in cases where it should be imposed, it would not be a punishment if insurance
paid the damages. See Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir.
1962).
118. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967).
119. Morris, supra note 10, at 1194-95.
120. Rheingold, supra note 1, at 135.
121. In deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 1970),
the court concluded that the problems created by multiple punitive damage claims
outweighed their doubtful deterrent impact. In Green v. Wolf, 406 F.2d 291, 303 (2d
Cir. 1968), the court considered the liability for multiple compensatory damages to be
sufficient to fulfill any purpose punitive damages could have.
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damages awards are not particularly appealing. One possibility
would be to inform the jury of the widespread injury and poten-
tial for substantial overall compensatory damages. In theory,
the jury could use this information to evaluate what would be
an appropriate punitive damages award. In practice, however,
it would probably bias the jury against the defendant. More-
over, the full effect of the defendant's misconduct might not be
known when the first few claims are litigated. Professor Morris
suggested that a judge could suspend determination of the pu-
nitive damages issue until the full extent of compensatory
damages was determined. '22 While this device might work
where the same judge is handling all cases, it is not suited to a
products liability situation where suits might be filed in courts
all over the country. The MER/29 litigation, for example, in-
volved suits filed in nearly every state in both state and federal
courts.' 3
Under circumstances where multiple injuries have a
common basis, the United States Judicial Conference can
order a consolidation of actions.'24 This was attempted in the
MER/29 litigation without success.'2 , Particularly in products
liability cases, personal or property injuries may not all be
manifested at the same time, thus making it difficult to join
cases. Judge Friendly was of the opinion that joint litigation,
at least in drug products liability, is not feasible without com-
prehensive legislation.'
Courts could fashion arbitrary rules that would limit
punitive damages to a certain amount in all cases or would
allow punitive damages only once when the same misconduct
results in multiple injuries.'27 Unfortunately, either rule re-
quires the cooperation of judges who may not accept them. For
example, a judge might not consider it fair for a plaintiff in hisjurisdiction to go without punitive damages simply because a
suit was tried in some other jurisdiction first.' Putting a limit
122. Morris, supra note 10, at 1195.
123. Rheingold, supra note 1, at 121.
124. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1964).
125. The Judicial Conference has no control over state courts, where nearly half
the MER/29 cases were then pending. Rheingold, supra note 1, at 126.
126. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 n.ll (2d Cir. 1967);
of. deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 1970).
127. The latter approach has been rejected by two courts. deHaas v. Empire
Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 1970) (securities fraud); Roginsky v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967) (products liability).
128. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 840 (2d Cir. 1967).
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on the amount of a punitive damages award will not always be
workable either since there is no way to know whether a few or
all of the punitive damages claims will result in such awards.
For example, despite the enormous punitive damages initially
sought in the MER/29 litigation, only two cases resulted in
punitive damages."'
Legislative Initiatives
If concern for consumer safety presents a compelling rea-
son to prevent even the risk of injury, it should be up to the
legislature to determine what risk is unreasonable. The legisla-
ture can also establish guidelines as to what punishment
should be imposed. Growing awareness of the need to promote
product safety led Congress, for example, to pass the Consumer
Product Safety Act and create the Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC) to monitor the safety of products and the
conduct of manufacturers in marketing their products."" The
CPSC can establish consumer product safety standards and
can enforce those standards by mandatory testing of a product
to ensure compliance. 3' In addition, the CPSC can order haz-
ardous consumer products banned from sale'32 and can seek
civil and criminal penalties against manufacturers.' '
The Consumer Product Safety Act specifically excludes all
types of food or drugs;'34 Congress determined that the safety
of those types of products was already effectively safe-
guarded.'3 ' The Food and Drug Administration has authority
to enjoin the sale of unreasonably dangerous foods and drugs136
129. After Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr.
398 (1967), allowed the plaintiff to recover punitive damages and in an effort to avoid
high compensatory judgments, Richardson-Merrell settledmost of the cases against
it. See DixoN, supra note 76, § 9.07121, at 9-81; Rheingold, supra note 1, at 134-39.
130. 15 U.S.C. § 2051-81 (1974); see Collins, Enforcement of the Federal Haz-
ardous Substance Act by the Consumer Product Safety Commission: Toying with the
Product Safety Cycle, 34 FED. B.J. 139 (1975). The law was designed in part to bring
together in a unified manner, the ineffective array of independent agencies handling
some aspect of consumer product safety. 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4575-78.
131. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2056, 2063 (1974).
132. Id. § 2057.
133. Id. § 2069. Civil fines are restricted to a maximum of $500,000.
134. Id. § 2052.
135. 1972 U.S. CODE CoNn. & An. NEWs 4580. The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
exists in part to promote product safety in the area of food and drugs. This act was
established by 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1972). But cf. Rheingold, supra note 1, at 146-
47.
136. 21 U.S.C. § 332 (1972). With regard to MER/29, the FDA did suspend the
new drug application to ban the drug from sale. However, Richardson-Merrell had
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and can also seek civil and criminal penalties against manufac-
turers. 1:11
Something beyond compensatory damages may be called
for to punish or deter manufacturers' misconduct. This added
liability is afforded by regulatory bodies, such as the CPSC and
the FDA, which at the same time can provide for a comprehen-
sive and uniform system of promoting consumer product
safety. To the extent these bodies are effective or indicate a
legislative position, punitive damages become less necessary.
CONCLUSION
Punitive damages developed as civil punishment for a de-
fendant who deliberately caused an injury or caused it nondeli-
berately under circumstances where the defendant must have
known an injury was nearly certain to result. This situation is
not likely to arise in a products liability case. But to the extent
that it does happen, courts should specifically determine that
a manufacturer intended to cause an injury. Generally, that
will involve a finding that profit was expected even though a
few injuries would have to be compensated.
The real concern of courts which have allowed punitive
damages, however, is that manufacturers who place products
on the market which could cause widespread injury to the pub-
lic ought to be subject to a higher duty of care than an individ-
ual. While intent to injure is the aggravating circumstance that
evokes punitive damages when an individual commits a tort,
"commercial callousness" ought to be the aggravating circum-
stance when the tort is by a manufacturer.
Punitive damages are one means of punishing a manufacu-
turer for its recklessness, but that may not be the best means.
There are no standards yet evolved by which to judge when a
manufacturer has been too callous. If the manufacturer is not
allowed to take any calculated risks, courts may seriously in-
hibit the development of new products, especially in the phar-
maceutical industry. Moreover, the potential for multiple lia-
bility not only serves as a deterrent because of the large com-
pensatory damages which might be awarded, but also opens
already withdrawn the drug from the market. Rheingold, supra note 1, at 120 & n.15.
137. 21 U.S.C. §§ 333-34. In the MER/29 litigation, Richardson-Merrell pleaded
nooI contendere to eight counts of making false statements to the FDA and was fined
$80,000. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 n.8 (2d Cir. 1967).
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the door to punitive damage claims far beyond any appropriate
punishment.
The rule that limits punitive damages to intentional inflic-
tion of injury is deeply rooted in the civil law and is a primary
reason that civil law allows more than compensation to a plain-
tiff. It is the province of the legislature, therefore, rather than
the courts to modify the current doctrine of punitive damages,
especially in states where that doctrine has been codified. In
this way, too, guidelines and limitations on awards can be im-
posed so that a manufacturer's insensitivity to safety can be
punished without being unfair. A preferable alternative to pu-
nitive damages is the development of agencies such as the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission to protect the public from
potentially unsafe products.
Douglas L. Carden

